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This Bulletin discusses Switzerland’s economic rela-
tions with the South; the authors specifically examine 
this topic using Zambia and its copper as examples. 
The contributions are part of an international research 
project funded by the Swiss Network for International 
Studies (SNIS) and led by Basel social anthropologist Rita 
Kesselring. The research project “Valueworks: Effects of 
Financialization along the Copper Value Chain” follows 
copper’s path from the mines to the end buyer and de-
scribes the parties involved in this process. It is shown 
that the extent of the participation of Swiss companies 
in the Zambian copper sector exceeds all expectations. 
This finding makes the under-regulation of the commodi- 
ties trading centre Switzerland even more problematic 
and shows that a broad political discussion is urgently 
needed. Since the Federal Council’s commodities report 
of 2013, things have remained quiet at the federal level. 
More than 20 researchers and representatives of non- 
governmental organizations (NGOs) from Switzerland, 
Germany, England, China and Zambia have gathered 
research results at three conferences in Switzerland and 
Zambia to date and looked for ways to make the findings 
available to a wider public. The closing event will take 
place on 11 December 2018 in Geneva at the UN. On 8 
December 2018, the Swiss Apartheid Debt and Repara-
tions Campaign (Swiss ADR), which is part of the re-
search project, will host its annual conference — once 
again in cooperation with the Afrika-Komitee and the 
Centre for African Studies Basel — entitled: “The Copper 
Value Chain: Life in Zambia, the Swiss Commodity Hub, 
and Responsible Business”. As in previous years, this 
Bulletin serves to prepare the content of the conference. 
In their article, authors Gregor Dobler and Rita Kes-
selring describe the various stages of the value chain at 
which Swiss companies operate in Zambia and skim off 
value that does not remain in Zambia. Stefan Leins takes 
a close look at the commodity-trading sector in Geneva 
and Zug and the conditions that make Switzerland at-
tractive to powerful global players. The article by James 
Musonda deals with the workers who mine copper and 
their perspective of the mining industry. My contribution 
describes the current political and economic situation, 
the fight against rampant corruption and the threat of 
loss of democracy, as well as Zambia’s high indebted-
ness.  •
I wish you stimulating and enlightening reading and 
cordially invite you to our conference.
Barbara Müller
Barbara Müller is a long standing 
member of Afrika-Komitee and 
the Swiss ADR Campaign
Contact: ba.muellerfrei@gmail.
com.
The two-year research project Valueworks, funded 
by SNIS (Swiss Network for International Studies), 
investigates the economic relations between 
Switzerland and Zambia in the field of copper 
mining and trading. The starting point was the 
massive increase in transit trade transactions 
via Switzerland, which have an impact on the en-
tire value chain, as project leader Rita Kessel-
ring explains.
A good number of large and small companies 
based in Switzerland “create value” from copper, often 
without being directly involved in the investment-in-
tensive mining of metals. If one considers the extent of 
Swiss companies’ participation in the Zambian copper 
sector,  one could get the impression that the sector is 
“remote-controlled” from Switzerland. Questions about 
who controls and exercises power in what way, also 
played a major role in the Valueworks research project. 
Connections of another kind also became apparent: 
Switzerland and Zambia are closely linked through civil 
society, for example, by the question of how much room 
for manoeuvre corporations should be allowed. The 
Valueworks project, which involved Swiss and Zambi-
an civil society groups and NGOs from the outset, is an 
example.
Resistance in Switzerland 
In Switzerland, there is a growing awareness of the 
extent of the commodities trading market and its un-
der-regulation. The Federal Council  has come to regard 
the sector as a potential reputational risk. A pilot study 
commissioned by the Federal Office for the Environ-
ment shows that the environmental damage associat-
ed with trade abroad is almost twenty times greater 
than the environmental impact of Swiss consumption as 
a whole (Jungbluth and Meili 2018). However, many 
companies have too few employees to fall within the 
scope of the version of the corporate responsibility in-
itiative on which the Council of States is expected to 
take a decision in spring 2019, and which has been re-
duced by the National Council. 
Criticism of Switzerland’s under-regulation as a trad-
ing centre is being voiced at various levels. Internation-
ally, ‘Public Eye’ publications are most present; howev-
er, a number of other NGOs and campaigns have been 
working on the issue for years. It is notoriously difficult 
to obtain reliable data on practices in Switzerland — or 
practices that Switzerland enables abroad. The indus-
try keeps a very low profile. 
In Switzerland, cantons undercut one another with 
low taxes and other incentives to attract companies. 
Low taxes on capital and capital gains are another po-
tential gateway for price-shifting practices that deprive 
the “host” country, which bears most of the negative 
impacts, of legitimate profits. Intra-company trade is 
common practice and can be employed to increase the 
profits of investors in the North. 
Whether this will lead to illegal tax optimization is 
difficult to say based on available data. In April 2011, 
‘Public Eye’ with Sherpa (France), the Centre for Trade 
Policy and Development (Zambia) and two Canadian 
NGOs filed a complaint with the OECD against Glencore 
and the Canadian mining group First Quantum Miner- 
als, whom they accused of tax evasion through their 
Zambian subsidiary Mopani Copper Mines. The media-
tion process ended without a result and all relevant 
documents remain confidential. 
Resistance in Zambia 
In Zambia, the extractive industry has been criti-
cized since industrialization. The renewed privatiza-
tion of mines at the end of the 1990s considerably weak-
ened Zambian trade unions. Since liberalization and 
targeted weakening by the ruling Patriotic Front party, 
civil society has become less organized. Nevertheless, 
national and regional meetings are held annually to gath-
er experience from various mines and mining towns 
and explore alternatives to mining. There are also on-
going courageous attempts to challenge extractivism. 
When Beatrice Mithi, then District Commissioner of 
Mufulira, died in 2013 as a result of sulphur dioxide emis-
sions, her widower turned to the courts. Mopani Cop-
per Mines, a Glencore mine, was fined to approximate-
ly US$ 40 000. The company appealed. 
In the Lungowe and Others versus Vedanta Re-
sources and Konkola Copper Mines class action, filed 
extraterritorially in England in 2015, with the help of the 
law firm Leigh Day, 1826 Zambians accused the Indian 
company of discharging toxic liquids into groundwater 
and rivers, with direct consequences for income and 
health. The lawsuits are still pending. It seems that trans- 
national organized resistance is most effective. 
Most attempts to hold companies accountable for 
human rights violations and disregard for environmen-
tal standards have a common focus that is almost ex-
clusively on mining. In this issue we show how far be- 
yond mining and trade extractivism reaches. Without 
getting their hands dirty, Swiss companies are siphon-
ing off margins along the value chain through services 
such as transport, logistics and certification. This issue 
intends to contribute to the discussion on regulation, 
redistribution and solidarity. •
The study mentioned in this article is freely accessible online:  
Niels Jungbluth und Christoph Meili: Pilot Study for the Analysis of 
the Environmental Impacts of Commodities Traded in Switzerland. 
Schaffhausen 2018 (ESU-services Ltd.). www.esu-services.ch/ 
fileadmin/download/jungbluth-2018-LCA-CommoditiesTrade.pdf
What Zambia and Switzerland Have in Common
Copper and Resistance to Extractivism
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Extractivism à la Suisse
The Role of Swiss Companies in the Copper Value Chain
The Swiss public is becoming increasingly aware 
that trading companies based in Switzerland play 
an important and at times problematic role in 
countries around the world. Gregor Dobler and 
Rita Kesselring follow the path of copper produced 
in Zambia from the mines to the ports in southern 
Africa and demonstrate the far-reaching part 
played by Swiss companies. 
Glencore, in particular, has become the embodi-
ment of the dark side of the Swiss success model; the 
company stands accused in numerous countries of cor-
ruption, human rights violations and illegal tax avoid-
ance. The persistent and painstaking efforts of a small 
number of NGOs usually focus on spectacular and high- 
profile cases of economic misconduct. The Responsible 
Business Initiative, which gains public support through 
such examples, is a step in the right direction, but is 
limited to denouncing and making justiciable excesses 
of economic activity. 
In these important discussions, we sometimes lose 
sight of everyday business conduct. Anyone who wants 
to understand the role of Swiss companies in the world 
must not concentrate on violations of the rules alone 
but must also ask what the rules themselves look like 
and who they favour. To what extent are Swiss compa-
nies actually involved in commodity trading in the every-
day reality of the global economy, and what are the 
consequences for the countries of origin of the com-
modities? To answer such questions, we explore a small 
section of the global economy: we follow the path tak-
en by copper mined in Zambia to the ports of Southern 
Africa, revealing the role of Swiss companies in mining, 
trade, transport and certification. 
Mining 
The most important copper mines in Zambia are in 
the hands of four international corporations, including 
Glencore. Glencore is the world’s largest commodities 
trading company and the Swiss company with the high-
est turnover. Glencore began as a pure trading compa-
ny, but, since the early 2000s, has invested heavily in 
the entire commodity chain to compensate for declin-
ing margins in the trading sector. When the Zambian 
mines were privatized, Glencore acquired a majority 
stake in the Mopani Copper Mines on favourable 
terms — shortly before the world market price for cop-
per increased six-fold due to China’s new global role. 
Glencore’s presence in Zambia is best known for the 
serious environmental problems caused by the compa-
ny’s mines and smelter over the years. The problems 
have been investigated and made public, not least by 
Swiss NGOs and media. Like the other mining compa-
nies, Glencore is trying, quite successfully, to keep its 
tax burden in Zambia low. In recent years, the Zambian 
government has repeatedly tried to increase the taxes 
and duties of mining companies to keep a larger part of 
the produced value in the country, but has always 
failed because companies resist and threaten to close 
down mines.
Trade 
Switzerland is currently the most important hub for 
international commodity trading. With a few exceptions 
(above all gold), trade is conducted as transit trade, in 
which traders from Switzerland buy and sell goods 
that never physically enter the country. A large part of 
Zambian copper is bought by Swiss companies and sold 
to the processing industry. 
Here, too, Glencore is an important player. The com-
pany’s mining division sells copper to its trading divi-
sion. Glencore has repeatedly been accused of using 
transfer pricing to shift profits to low-tax countries like 
Switzerland, but so far in Zambia, this suspicion has not 
been officially confirmed. 
While Glencore is a trading company that has be-
come a mine owner, the opposite is the case with the 
largest Zambian mine operator: First Quantum Miner-
als (FQM) is a Canadian-Australian mining company that 
operates two of the largest mines in the country. FQM 
does not like to talk about it, but also for them, Switzer-
land represents the hub for marketing their copper. 
Metal Corp Trading AG, a company that has a letterbox 
and a commercial register entry in Zug but conducts 
most of its business from London, is one of only two 
buyers of copper produced by FQM in Zambia. 
The second customer, Trafigura, who we will be 
looking at in more detail shortly, does not own any 
mines in Zambia, but plays an important role in copper 
logistics and transport. 
In addition to these three companies, which buy 
and sell large quantities of copper through stable sup-
ply contracts and can therefore be tracked down local-
ly, many other Swiss commodity traders trade in cop-
per mined in Zambia. Often, a batch of copper passes 
through many hands and plays a role in a lot of finan-
cial products before it is finally sold to a consumer and 
processed into circuit boards or coils. Large commodi-
ty trading houses participate, as do specialized smaller 
traders and the trading departments of banks, insur-
ance companies, funds and institutional investors.
Transport 
No matter where it ends up and how long it takes to 
process, almost all the copper produced in Zambia 
leaves the country quickly. It is transported on trucks 
or, less frequently, by rail to the ports of neighbouring 
countries, especially to Durban, Walvis Bay, Beira and 
Dar-es-Salaam. Since land transport often lasts three 
weeks, it accounts for a large proportion of the total 
transport costs and is at the same time one of the few 
sections of the raw material chain in which costs can 
still be significantly reduced. This is why trading and 
logistics companies have recently invested a great deal 
in this section of the value chain. At the same time, to-
gether with other international and national players, 
they have lobbied for debt-financed government infra-
structure investments to better link mining areas to 
international markets. 
Today, Swiss companies are among the interna-
tional investors who control the transport of copper in 
Southern Africa. First and foremost is Trafigura, a com-
pany founded in Geneva in 1993 as an offshoot of Marc 
Rich Trading, from which Glencore also emerged. Tra-
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figura’s structure is too complicated to break down 
here. The company’s headquarters remain in Geneva, 
but due to the tax-optimized distribution of different 
sub-companies to different seats, Trafigura’s effective 
tax rate today is only 8.4 percent across the group (Tra- 
figura Annual Report 2017, page 15). 
The logistics arm of Trafigura, Impala Terminals, 
plays an important role in the transport of Zambian 
copper. Impala relies on the port in Dar-es-Salaam, 
where it owns the largest terminal used by a single 
customer. The company has set up warehouses in Kol-
wezi, Lubumbashi, Ndola and Dar-es-Salaam as inter-
mediate stations between the DRC’s and Zambia’s 
mines, which are connected by a dense network of safe 
truck stations. Other trading companies also use the 
warehouse in Ndola as a reloading station and duty- 
free warehouse. 
Unlike in neighbouring Congo, Swiss companies in 
Zambia have not yet invested directly in shipping com-
panies and transport fleets, but another Trafigura sub-
contractor gains from almost every transportation. 
Puma Energy is a joint venture between Trafigura (49 
percent), Angola’s state oil company Sonangol (28 per-
cent) and Cochan Holdings, a company of the contro-
versial Angolan general and billionaire Leopoldino Fra-
goso de Nascimento (15 percent). As in some neigh- 
bouring countries, Puma acquired a majority stake (75 
percent) in the former BP filling stations in Zambia in 
2011. The company also operates a large oil and fuel 
storage facility in Walvis Bay. Another joint venture be-
tween Trafigura and Cochan, DTS Holding, is currently 
redeveloping the old railway route from Kolwezi to 
Lobito in Angola. 
Switzerland’s involvement in transport does not 
end at the ports: the world’s second-largest cargo ship-
ping company, Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC), 
is also based in Geneva and plays an important role in 
the ports of Southern Africa.
Testing and Certification 
In the international copper business many parties 
must make decisions about goods that they cannot in-
spect. Copper of certain specifications is sold, bought, 
financed, insured or cleared remotely without the con-
tracting parties themselves being able to control the 
quantity and quality themselves. As in many other are-
as of international trade, independent inspection com-
panies are increasingly coming into play. On behalf of 
the contracting parties, they test, inspect and certify 
the traded goods. 
One of the largest of these groups is based in Geneva: 
SGS (formerly Société Générale de Surveillance). The 
company is very active in various business areas in 
many African countries. A Zambian subsidiary oper-
ates an important testing laboratory for the mining in-
dustry in Kalulushi, and subsidiaries of SGS offer test-
ing services for copper transports at all major tranship- 
ment points to ensure that all parties involved know 
the details of the contents of the sealed containers.
Switzerland’s role in extractivism 
The examples described here do not, by any means, 
cover all areas in which Swiss companies are important 
for copper mining and transport in Southern Africa. We 
have not looked at the role of banks and insurance 
companies nor asked how investment funds based in 
Switzerland invest their money; we have left aside me-
chanical engineering as well as the chemicals used in 
mining. However, even the few examples chosen make 
it clear that while commodity trading itself plays an 
enormous role, it is only the tip of the iceberg. Swiss 
companies earn money at many points along the value 
chain. This is good for Switzerland, but further reduces 
Zambia’s share of the profits from extraction. Typical-
ly, Swiss companies invest in areas that tie up relatively 
little capital on a permanent basis and are not tied to a 
single commodity and its market fluctuations, but 
where they have a decisive competitive advantage due 
to Switzerland’s reputation, education, good contacts 
with banks and insurance companies and worldwide 
networks. 
Anyone interested in Switzerland’s role in the global 
economy should therefore not just look at excesses — 
not just at human rights violations, environmental deg· 
ra· da· tion or cases of corruption. Everyday profit-ori-
ented business also cements and increases existing 
inequalities. The infrastructure for these businesses in 
Southern Africa is largely financed by taxpayers, while 
profits often go to capital owners in the north. The 
taxes that could cushion against this imbalance and 
ensure partial redistribution can often be avoided by 
globally active corporations, whether in Switzerland or 
Zambia. Anyone who thinks about corporate responsi-
bility also has to think about these interrelationships.•
Gregor Dobler is Professor of Social Anthropology at the 
University of Freiburg (D) and visitor at the Institute for Advanced 
Study in Princeton until mid-2019. Contact: gregor.dobler@ethno.
uni-freiburg.de. 
Rita Kesselring is a Fung Global Fellow at Princeton University  
until mid-2019. She teaches at the Chair of Social Anthropology of 
the University of Basel and heads the research project Valueworks. 
Contact: rita.kesselring@unibas.ch.
Swiss companies are not 
only major players in the 
copper trade but also make 
profits in its transport 
(picture: Rita Kesselring 
2015).
Geneva, Zug, Lugano
The World of Swiss Commodity Traders — and its Global Signi ficance
Switzerland’s significance in global commodity 
trading is unknown to many people, including a 
large part of the the Swiss population. And with 
the exception of Glencore, only a few people are 
familiar with the internationally active and high- 
turnover commodity companies based in Switzer-
land that make a lot of money. With his contribu-
tion, Stefan Leins wants to create some clarity.
Switzerland is currently the largest commodities 
trading centre in the world. Around one third of all raw 
materials traded worldwide are traded via Switzerland. 
With certain commodities, it amounts to even more than 
half of world trade (e.g. metals, coffee or sugar). Around 
500 Switzerland based companies are active in com-
modities trading and account for around four percent 
of the gross domestic product. In the canton of Geneva, 
Switzerland’s largest commodities trading location, this 
figure is as high as twenty percent. 
History of Switzerland as a hub  
for raw materials
Although commodity trade has grown dramatical-
ly in the last two decades, Switzerland has a longer 
tradition of trading raw materials. Since the 15th centu-
ry, Swiss families have traded in “colonial goods” such as 
salt, cotton, coffee, cereals, palm oil, rubber and cocoa. 
In the mid-20th century, Switzerland also became the 
host country to two companies that were influential in 
the development of transnational commodity trade. In 
1956, Cargill, presently the third largest company op-
erating in Switzerland, opened its trading office in Ge-
neva. In 1957 Philipp Brothers followed with its Euro- 
pean headquarters in Zug. It was this company that later 
trained the “King of Oil” Marc Rich. Along with Nestlé, 
which has been active in the Lake Geneva region since 
the 19th century, these companies laid the foundations 
for Switzerland to become the global centre of com-
modity trading. In 1974, Marc Rich became an independ-
ent trader and founded Marc Rich + Co AG in Zug. This 
company was renamed Glencore in 1994. At about the 
same time Trafigura, another global player in commod-
ity trading, was founded in Lucerne (today Trafigura 
operates mainly from Geneva). In parallel, many foreign 
companies involved in commodities trading moved their 
headquarters or trading offices to Switzerland. This led 
to a dramatic increase in trading activity, particularly 
after the year 2000.
Why Switzerland? 
In Marc Rich’s biography, Daniel Amman explains 
that Philipp Brothers, a US company, established its 
European headquarters in Zug because of its political 
neutrality, banking secrecy and low taxes. In addition, 
many practitioners say that the geographically favour-
able location, the cosmopolitan environment (with many 
international organizations based in Geneva), the strong 
presence of banks with expertise in trade finance and 
the business-friendly political landscape are pull factors 
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for commodity traders. Personal networks are also of 
great importance. Most business relationships are based 
on long-term informal networks. In Geneva, these net-
works often include people from international organi-
zations and diplomatic personnel. 
A striking number of the points mentioned are di-
rectly related to Switzerland’s political and regulatory 
environment. Political neutrality, for example, is not 
just an ideological attitude. For commodity traders, it 
is also an opportunity to trade with countries under em-
bargo. Marc Rich made this one of his “competitive ad-
vantages”. He used Switzerland as a platform for trade 
with Iran and the South African apartheid regime when 
they were confronted with sanctions from the interna-
tional community. Even today, Swiss companies trade 
with partners that other countries regard as problem-
atic. They can do this partly because of Switzerland’s 
neutrality policy and partly because of Swiss banking 
secrecy, which protects them from jurisdictions seek-
ing access to their financial data. However, this type of 
business activity has recently become riskier due to 
external pressure. For example, BNP Paribas, a leader 
in financing Swiss commodity traders, had to withdraw 
from the business when found guilty in the US of financ-
ing trade with Iran, Cuba and Sudan. 
Nevertheless, it remains the case that Swiss-based 
commodity trading companies benefit from lax state 
regulation. This is despite the fact that non-governmen-
tal organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations 
(CSOs) have been pointing out for years that the lack of 
sector-specific supervision represents an enormous risk 
for Switzerland. On the other hand, transit trade in com-
modities is extremely capital-intensive and possible 
mis-investments could burden the entire Swiss econo-
my. In addition, there are reputational risks associated 
with transnational commodity trading. Commodities 
are largely mined in the countries of the global South, 
trading companies often operate in weakly regulated 
contexts. 
This has led to several scandals and accusations that 
Swiss commodity trading companies benefit from poor 
working conditions and environmental standards in 
the global South — or even promote them. In order to 
prevent such problems in the future, binding rules re-
garding compliance with working and environmental 
standards would be important. It should also be borne 
in mind that commodity traders often are not directly 
involved in the extraction of the goods they trade but 
buy them from the mining companies only after they 
have been extracted. The challenge of sector-specific 
regulation would therefore lie primarily in clarifying to 
what extent commodity trading companies can be held 
responsible for environmental and labour law issues 
along the entire supply chain.
A versatile and complex business field 
Swiss commodity trading encompasses far more 
activities than just the direct purchase and sale of com-
modities. The field also includes ship brokers, certifica-
tion companies, commercial financial institutions, legal 
advisors and many other players. The complexity of this 
profession can be seen in the diversity of the players in 
the region around Geneva and Lausanne. Here, for ex-
Geneva, Zug, Lugano
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ample, one can find exponents of the shipping indus-
try, which consists of around 100 companies. Together, 
they organize and coordinate 22 percent of worldwide 
ship movements. Geneva is also a world leader in the 
certification of goods. This is demonstrated, for exam-
ple, by the fact that SGS (formerly Société Générale de 
Surveillance) is based in Geneva. SGS is the largest pro-
vider of product samples, tests and certifications and 
is used by almost all Geneva trading companies as a part- 
ner institution. 
The commodity trading companies are concentrat-
ed in three regions: Geneva (oil and agricultural prod-
ucts), Zug (mainly metals) and Lugano (especially gold). 
Each region has its own regional association: the Gene-
va Trade and Shipping Association (GTSA, now merged 
with STSA) is the largest organization and represents 
around 100 members. The Lugano Commodity Trad-
ing Association (LCTA) has around 50 members, the 
ZCA around 40 members. The STSA, based in Geneva, 
acts as the umbrella organization of the regional asso-
ciations. The STSA is active both in lobbying and orga- 
nizing training courses. The STSA has strong links with 
the University of Geneva, where it co-organises and 
co-finances a master’s programme and a diploma for 
advanced studies in commodities trading. In 2015, the 
STSA, with a number of governmental and entrepre-
neurial institutions, founded the Swiss Research Insti-
tute for Commodities (SRIC). In future, this should cre-
ate a platform for research and serve as a discussion 
forum for actors in the public and private sectors.
From soy to copper: categories of traded goods
In physical trading, commodities are usually cate-
gorized as follows:  
•  Agricultural products (also called “soft commodities”): 
cereals, cattle, sugar, soybeans, cocoa, coffee, etc.
•  Energy: crude oil, natural gas, nuclear energy, hydro-
power, etc.
•  Metals: iron ore, copper, aluminium, nickel, lead, etc.
Some trading companies specialize in individual 
commodities, while others trade in various commodi-
ties from one or more of the above categories. In order 
to trade in a particular commodity, a trading house 
must have considerable expertise in that commodity. 
This is mainly because commodity traders also organ-
ize the physical transport of the cargo. 
Commodities can be traded either “on the market” 
or “over-the-counter” (OTC). Market trading means that 
they are traded as public contracts and at a price set by 
a particular exchange such as the London Metals Ex-
change (LME), the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) or the 
Shanghai Futures Exchange (SHFE). OTC trading means 
that commodity traders enter into a bilateral and private 
agreement. They are often guided by a market price. 
However, they can also agree on prices that differ from 
the public market price. 
The physical goods traded in Switzerland rarely 
reach the country as the actual destination. Swiss trad-
ers generally act as intermediaries between producers 
and consumers. The goods are then delivered directly 
to the respective counterparty. This entire logistics pro-
cess is often organised by the same Swiss trading com-
pany that initiated the trade in the first place. Swiss 
commodity traders are thus large logistics companies 
with links to producers, ports, shippers, customs offi-
cials, local brokers and consumers. Establishing and 
maintening social and economic networks are their 
core competence. •
Further texts:
•  Erklärung von Bern: Rohstoffe. Das gefährlichste Geschäft der 
Schweiz. Zürich 2011 (Salis).
•  Nina Eggert und Giovanni Ferro-Luzzi: Commodity Trading Monitor-
ing Report, 12. März 2017. Online:  
https://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:94096/ATTACHMENT01
•  Lea Haller: Globale Geschäfte. In NZZ Geschichte 4 (2016),  
Seiten 80 – 95.
•  SECO: Grundlagenbericht Rohstoffe: Bericht der interdepartemen- 
talen Plattform Rohstoffe an den Bundesrat, 27. März 2013. Online: 
www.news.admin.ch/NSBSubscriber/message/attachments/30133.
pdf
•  Akademien der Wissenschaften Schweiz: Die Schweiz und der Roh- 
stoffhandel. Was wissen wir ? Bilanz und Ausblick. Swiss Academies 
Factsheet, Band 11, No. 1, 2016. Online:  
https://tinyurl.com/factsheet-rohstoffhandel 
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Working in Zambia’s Mines after Privatization
Changing Meanings for Miners
Privatization has significantly changed Zambia’s 
mining sector. For multinational companies, profit 
maximization is the main goal. This fact has con-
sequences on many levels, particularly on min-
ers’ working conditions. The Zambian anthropol-
ogist James Musonda examines what this means 
for mine workers.
The privatization of the national mining company 
Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) that ended 
in 2000 sought to achieve two financial goals. The first 
was to stem the operating losses borne by the public 
budget that were crowding out already low public ex-
penditure. The second was to reverse a 30-year trend of 
underinvestment in exploration and production, which, 
in large measure, was responsible for the losses. Cer-
tainly, capital inflows to the sector have been substan-
tial since privatization and have exceeded the commit-
ments originally anticipated. Between 2000 and 2015, 
a total of US$ 13.1 billion was invested in the sector. This 
investment has facilitated the reopening of previously 
closed mines, exploration and opening up of new mines 
in North Western province, and investment in machin-
ery, equipment and technology. 
Rapid expansion
Accordingly, production increased from 250,000 
tons of copper and cobalt in the 1990s to 710,800 tons 
in 2015. As a result of this, in 2014, Zambia was ranked 
2nd largest copper producer in Africa (D. R Congo in 1st 
position) and 8th in the world. Exploration has shown 
promise for copper and cobalt in new areas. Manga-
nese, uranium, coal and gold are other minerals of great 
potential that exploration efforts have revealed. 
Between 1997 and 1998, ZCCM’s reported pre-tax 
losses totalled approximately US$ 650 million — almost 
$ 1 million per day — equivalent to more than 20 percent 
of total turnover. However, soon after privatization 
things changed. Between 2002 and the top of the market 
in April 2008, copper prices rose six-fold, from around 
US$ 1,500 per ton to over US$ 9,000 per ton (based on 
2010 prices). Prices at their peak in 2008 were 20 per-
cent higher than their 1974 peak and double the aver-
age price since the end of World War I. Yet a significant 
portion of this profit accrued to foreign investors and 
was taken out of the country as dividends or as foreign 
capital outflows. 
Dependency on the extractive sector
As would be expected, exports earnings from the 
mineral sector rose from US$ 670 million in 2002 to 
US$ 4 billion in 2008, an increase of almost 500 percent. 
Whereas in 2002, earnings from copper were around 
twice as much as net overseas development assistance, 
in 2008, as copper earnings exploded, the ratio was 
approximately seven to one. Combining the results for 
copper and cobalt, the calculated total net windfall in-
come accruing to the economy from 2002 to 2008 was 
14.8 trillion Kwacha, equivalent to around 66 percent 
of the base-year GDP. 
In line with these developments, the Zambian econ-
omy grew by between 5 and 7 percent a year since 2004, 
and in 2011, the country was reclassified as a lower-mid- 
dle-income country by the World Bank, a status lost in 
the 1980s. Despite the decline in the price of copper 
since the boom, the extractive industry accounted for 
75 percent of exports, 26 percent of government reve-
nues, and 10 percent of GDP in 2015. This is besides the 
claim by War on Want (2016) that the people of Zambia 
lose up to US$ 3 billion a year to tax avoidance and 
evasion by multinationals in the mining sector. At what 
cost to labour has this increase in production, profits 
and revenue been achieved? Poverty remains very high 
and many workers in the sector have lost their jobs.
Workers paid the price
Labour retrenchment and subcontracting are the 
two most salient outcomes of the privatization of the 
Zambian mining sector. Between 1991 and 2015, the 
number of workers directly employed by the mining 
companies on permanent and pensionable positions 
declined by 60 percent — from 56,582 to 23,479. Mean-
while, subcontracting rose from 10 percent in 1997 to 
over 50 percent by 2015. Unfortunately, most of these 
jobs are short term, poorly paid, lack unionization and 
social security such as pensions. This situation is a ma-
jor concern to the mine workers and has significantly 
changed the meanings attached to employment by these 
workers and their families. 
During the era of the national mining company, Zam-
bia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM), working for the 
mines meant direct, full-time employment with union 
membership and pension benefits. Workers were also 
entitled to several social benefits such as free housing, 
electricity and water, health care, subsidised education 
for their children, and birth grants.
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The neighbourhood of the 
Mopani mine in Mufulira 
(Zambia). The meaning of 
the mining sector as an 
employer has radically 
changed (picture: 
www.dirtyprofits.de 2017).
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Changing Meanings for Miners
Post-privatization, long term employment is no 
longer a guarantee, while social welfare has either been 
completely withdrawn or significantly reduced. 
Loans as the supposed way out
Accordingly, mine workers are aware that employ-
ment in the mines no longer provides a cradle to grave 
cover. Rather, it provides access to loans, which people 
can use to invest in children’s education, housing, or to 
start businesses. This view has led to an increase in the 
number of employees obtaining loans from the financial 
sector. On average, despite bank interest rates as high 
as 40 percent, over 75 percent of all directly employed 
miners in Zambia have loans. With these, a number 
have built houses, bought plots or cars, sent their chil-
dren to school or run small businesses alongside for-
mal employment. As one miner argued, “what is the 
point of waiting for retirement, when I can get a loan and 
get a house for my family”. In essence, most of them 
are now semi-formal or semi-informal workers. In 2015 
for instance, of the 4,300 miners retrenched at Mopani 
Copper Mines, 1,249 (or 30 percent of total retrenches) 
volunteered to be retrenched. 
The major problem however has been that many 
started businesses without any prior financial manage-
ment experience or knowledge. Consequently, the ma-
jority of those businesses fail. Similarly, many invest in 
long-term projects such as education and building hous-
es and find it difficult to meet their everyday needs. This 
pushes them to borrow from local lenders at interest 
rates as high as 50 percent, and repayment is done at 
the end of the month the loan was obtained. Borrowing 
from local money lenders is on the basis of collateral in 
form of household goods, title deeds, phones as well as 
bank cards and identity documents. Failure to repay 
automatically results in losing these items. Bank cards 
are only returned when the loan has been repaid in full. 
As these families struggle to make a living, they turn to 
the union to obtain food and groceries on credit, also 
due at the end of the month. 
How miners deal with the burden of debts
As their debt burden increases they resolve to other 
means of negotiating their financial vulnerability. One 
way is by repaying back loans using loans obtained from 
another lender. The other way is by opening savings 
accounts that are directly alimented by their salaries. 
Thereby they are able to prevent the money lender, who 
now holds their bank card, from accessing their earn-
ings. Lastly, some miners resort to offer themselves for 
retrenchment so that they are able to settle their debt 
using their retrenchment package and start all over 
again as subcontractors, as small business men. As 
John, an operator, explained: “After getting a loan I in-
vested in a business that failed and spent the rest on 
building the house. But at the end of the month I was 
remaining with nothing as the bank was getting almost 
every bit of my salary. I had to leave the job and pay off 
this debt and start all over. I don’t mind the low pay 
because I have a house, I don’t have to pay rent and I 
have no loan obligations. I am upgrading myself aca-
demically and I know that one day I will find a stable 
job even in the government.”  
Besides debt, many miners in Zambia agree that 
with a government and union that is unable to regulate 
the labour market, subcontracting is the future of work 
in Zambia’s mining sector. This is because the new min-
ing companies run a profit driven production system 
with retrenchment of workers as the first response to 
commodity price volatility, and subcontracting is their 
main way of reducing production costs. As one miner 
lamented: “When we will lose our jobs, if we are lucky 
we will get a job as a contractor. I think that going for-
ward all jobs in the mine will be sub-contracted. These 
days, when I go home from work, my wife and even chil-
dren ask me if I still have a job. Losing a job is so com-
mon that people are almost always expect it.”
From the above, it is clear that labour has paid the 
highest price for the privatization of the mines. Em-
ployment in the mines, previously understood as long 
term, permanent, direct and pensionable is now sub-
contracted, temporal and precarious, while retrench-
ments are frequent. To negotiate their employment in-
security, workers resort to borrowing. Unfortunately, a 
lack of financial management knowledge means that 
financial outcomes are mostly negative. Coupled with 
high lending interest rates from banks and local mon-
ey lenders, many end up with almost nothing to live on. 
In a context in which miners think that unions and gov-
ernment cannot help, many now accept that the future 
of work in the mines is in subcontracting. • 
James Musonda is a PhD candidate in the WORKinMINING  
project at the University of Liège, Belgium. Contact:  
musondajamesc@gmail.com
Mining companies 
externalize security issues 
to its labour force. First 
Quantum Minerals, Solwezi, 
Zambia (picture: Rita 
Kesselring 2016).
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sponsible taking measures to prevent such an incident 
from occurring again. Laura Miti regrets that none of 
this has happened. With five other activists, she has 
been at the centre of legal proceedings since 2017.
#42for42 
What are the activists accused of ? On 29 September 
2017, six civil society representatives, including rapper 
Fumba Chama (stage name Pilato), demonstrated in 
front of parliament with placards against the misuse of 
public funds, in particular the purchase of 42 fire trucks 
for US$ 42 million, where the actual cost of such a vehi-
cle is estimated at US$ 200,000. The activists demand-
ed clarification and accountability. They were arrested 
and accused of disregarding orders. Since then, they 
have repeatedly had to appear before court, only to hear 
that the trial has once again been postponed. Pilato re-
ceived threats because of the song Koswe Mumpoto, de-
nouncing rampant corruption, and had to temporarily 
seek safety in South Africa. Amnesty International de-
scribed the complaint against the activists as political-
ly motivated and an affront to justice. “These activists are 
judged only because they demand transparency and 
accountability in the use of public funds. They have com-
mitted no crime and should never have been charged,” 
said Deprose Muchena, Amnesty’s regional director for 
Southern Africa. 
The case has exemplary significance, as Laura Miti 
writes: “Freedom of expression is increasingly restrict-
ed in Zambia, especially under the current government. 
Our activism, which was strong a few years ago, has de- 
clined because people risk being arrested. But in recent 
months, civil society has caught up in order to expand 
the ever-smaller democratic space. My dream is a Zam-
bia that is rising up again.” 
Fire trucks are not the only case of corruption that 
has come to light in recent months. In May 2018, it be-
came known that US$ 1 million worth of medicine and 
first aid kits donated by the Global Fund had disap-
peared. Zambia has since undertaken to reimburse the 
value. Furthermore, in June 2018, the Zambian Finan-
cial Intelligence Centre (FIC) published a report accus-
ing cabinet members of stealing millions of Kwachas 
from the public sector through money laundering. The 
accused were not brought to justice as a result, but in-
stead the president of the FIC was criticized for the 
publication of the report. Since President Lungu took 
office in January 2015, corruption has become an in-
creasingly visible element of public life. The governing 
party Patriotic Front (PF) is in an obvious buying fren-
zy, ordering infrastructure projects at grotesquely in-
flated prices. These projects serve the extractive indus-
try in particular and are mostly carried out by foreign 
owned companies. Military spending is also high, and 
in spite of the obvious crisis, the government recently 
ordered airplanes for the air force and a luxury jet for the 
president from Israel, as Africa Confidential reported.
Zambia in crisis 
Rising fuel prices, a rapid devaluation of the nation-
al currency Kwacha as well as conflicts with donor coun-
tries are the consequences of Zambia’s high indebted-
ness from investments in projects such as roads and 
Currently in Zambia
Fight against Corruption and Loss of Democracy 
The current situation in Zambia is characterised by 
mismanagement, corruption, indebtedness and an 
increasingly shrinking democratic space. Civil so-
ciety organizations are resisting these develop-
ments, as Barbara Müller shows in her report.
On 6 October 2018, the student Vespers Shimuzhila 
died in her room on the campus of the University of 
Zambia (UNZA), Lusaka. She suffocated as a result of 
the tear gas canisters that police threw into student 
living quarters. This disproportionate action against 
protesting students was met with strong criticism. At 
the funeral procession through the inner city, thou-
sands marched and demanded “Justice for Vespers”. In 
protest against police brutality, students, dressed in 
black, took to the streets and blocked traffic so that the 
entire city centre came to a standstill. Minister of Infor-
mation Dora Siliya, who attended Vespers’ funeral ser-
vice, was insulted by students as she left the church. 
She reacted with a tweet in which she attributed re-
sponsibility for Vespers’ death to the students. On Oc-
tober 15, 2018, lecturer Dr. Austin Mbozi was arrested 
on the basis of an article in which he made the govern-
ment and the president responsible for Vesper’s death. 
The leadership of the Lecturers’ Association (UNZALA-
RU) was also questioned by the police about its role in 
student protests. UNZALARU demanded the immedi-
ate release of member Austin Mbozi. Protests were trig-
gered by government initially cutting payments to the 
university, including student food subsidies, and re-
taining them from August 2018. In addition, the stu-
dent association was suspended. 
In an article addressing this tragic incident, the Zam- 
bian activist Laura Miti asked: “Did the responsible au-
thorities ever say that they were sorry ?” She criticizes 
the university administration and the police, who with 
their actions accepted the possibility of student deaths. 
She also criticizes the ruling party, which did not, for a 
moment, concern itself with the death of an innocent 
person. An honest remedy would also include those re-
Demonstration during the 
budget speech of the 
Minister of Finance. 
Lusaka 28 September 
2018 (picture made 
available by the author). 
airports. The cost of living has risen dramatically and 
the population is suffering as a result. Drastic cuts in 
spending on health, education and other public ser- 
vices increase social inequality, already very high in 
Zambia (ranking fourth in the worldwide index for ine-
quality). Students have already protested, and other 
social protests could follow. 
A decade ago the country was practically debt-free. 
When the PF came to power in 2011, foreign debt was 
still US$ 1.9 billion. Within seven years, this rose to 9.4 
billion, with experts fearing that the real debt burden 
is even higher because not all foreign obligations are 
publicly known. Investments were financed by so-called 
Eurobonds, issued in 2012 at an interest rate of 5.6 
percent. By 2017, however, this had risen to 17 percent 
due to Zambia’s poor debtor quality. The International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and international markets regard 
the country’s over-indebtedness as dangerous and do 
not rule out insolvency. Relations between Zambia and 
the IMF are strained, as Lungu ignores measures de-
manded by the IMF to restructure public finances. When 
another massive corruption scandal became known at 
the end of September, donors England, Ireland and the 
Scandinavian countries stopped providing aid to Zam-
bia. 
To counter this crisis, the government is now trying 
to increase taxes paid by mining companies. In return, 
they — including Glencore — have threatened to lay off 
workers. As in previous attempts, the government has 
signalled its willingness to negotiate. In order to find a 
way out, Zambia has successfully found alternative do-
nors such as China and Saudi Arabia, which is not well-
seen by the West. 
Zambia has thus far been regarded as a country 
with a tradition of democracy. This could change with 
mismanagement under Lungu, accompanied by increas-
ingly authoritarian tendencies that do not bode well for 
the future. Zambian civil society is feeling the increas-
ing repression and is fighting to preserve democratic 
freedoms. It deserves support in its efforts. •
Demonstration during  
the budget speech of the 
Minister of Finance.  
Lusaka 28 September 2018 
(picture made available  
by the author). 
  About Laura Miti
Laura Miti is the director of the Zambian NGO Al-
liance for Community Action. For 20 years she has 
spoken out for democratic rights, transparency 
and social justice. In December 2018 she will visit 
Switzerland as a speaker at the conference “The 
Copper Value Chain. Life in Zambia, the Swiss 
Commodity Hub and Responsible Business”, 
which takes place in Basel on 8 December 2018. 
The conference is organised by the Swiss ADR 
Campaign in cooperation with the Centre for Af-
rican Studies and the Afrika-Komitee.
Barbara Müller is a member 
of the Afrika-Komitee and 
the Swiss ADR Campaign 
and is involved in the SNIS 
project Valueworks. Contact: 
ba.muellerfrei@gmail.com.
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Mufulira Wants to Finally Have Clean Water
“Those who can, move away from here,” said our 
partners from the town of Mufulira in the Zambian 
Copperbelt. The Mopani copper mine has been majority- 
owned by Glencore since the Zambian mines were pri-
vatized at the beginning of the 2000s. Many hoped for 
an improvement in living conditions, but this did not 
happen. The house façades peel off due to the acid rain, 
the air causes breathing problems, and many jobs in 
the mine have disappeared. And then there is the “drink-
ing water”: with visible residue, which nobody drinks 
before having first boiled it. Since they cannot move 
away, the residents of the neighbourhoods Butondo, 
Kankoyo and Kantanshi around the mine Mopani want 
access to clean water. 
The water supply for Butondo, Kankoyo and Kantan-
shi is provided by the Mulonga Water and Sewerage 
Company. Mopani treats and transfers water for Mu- 
longa. The water quality has been poor for many years, 
and local NGOs have reactivated the Mufulira Civil So-
ciety Organisations’ Forum to launch a campaign for 
clean water. A meeting with representatives of the Swiss 
ADR Campaign in summer 2017 confirmed this decision.
The Mufulira CSO Forum was motivated to get to 
work, and with financial support from the SOLIFONDS, 
they launched the campaign at the end of 2017.
First, water tests had to be carried out. Various water 
samples were tested by recognized laboratories. Results 
showed that the water did not meet legal standards. 
Values for lead and cadmium were far above permitted 
values. Excessively high lead or cadmium values can 
lead to kidney damage, and cadmium is classified as a 
carcinogen. At the first meeting between Mopani, Mu-
longa, the Mufulira CSO Forum and representatives of 
the communities, Mopani and Mulonga denied the 
poor water quality. When measurement results were 
presented in a second meeting, Mopani and Mulonga 
reacted differently: Mopani dismissed the results as 
false, while Mulonga seemed concerned. When the 
Mufulira CSO Forum went to press, Mopani also re- 
sponded to the pressure. Both now want to carry out 
their own tests.
The fact that Mopani and Mulonga even acknowl-
edge that there is a drinking water problem is a first 
important success for the Mufulira CSO Forum. Anoth-
er positive result was the successful involvement of com-
munity members. The Forum is now collecting signa-
tures for a petition to the authorities, demanding that 
Mulonga and Mopani take finally measures to ensure 
that residents of Mufulira have clean drinking water. 
The fight for clean water in Mufulira is now entering the 
next round. •
Aurora García, Solifonds
  Events related to the theme of the issue
Life Along the Copper Value Chain: 
The Swiss Commodity Trading Hub and its 
Impact on the Global South
The findings of the Valueworks project 
mentioned in this issue will be presented at 
two events in Geneva, apart from the confer-
ence in Basel on the 8th of December:
10th December 2018, 18 – 20 hrs
Roundtable at the Graduate Institute for 
International and Development Studies
11th December 2018, 9 –17 hrs
Symposium at the Palais des Nations
Info: www.unrisd.org
A sample of “drinking 
water” in Kankoyo, 
Mufulira, presented during 
a site-visit of the Swiss 
ADR Campaign (picture: 
Rita Kesselring 2017).
